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Abstract
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium monetary model where
a shortage of collateral and incomplete markets motivate the formation
of credit relationships and the rehypothecation of assets. Rehypothe-
cation improves resource allocation because it permits liquidity to flow
where it is most needed. The liquidity benefits associated with re-
hypothecation are shown to be more important in high-inflation (high
interest rate) regimes. Regulations restricting the practice are shown to
have very different consequences depending on how they are designed.
Assigning collateral to segregated accounts, as prescribed in the Dodd-
Frank Act, is generally welfare-reducing. In contrast, an SEC15c3-3
type regulation can improve welfare through the regulatory premium
it confers on cash holdings, which are inefficiently low when interest
rates and inflation are high.
Keywords: rehypothecation, money, collateral, credit relationship.
JEL codes: E4, E5
∗We would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
We thank conference participants at the 10th Annual Conference on General Equilibrium
& its Applications at Yale University, the First African Search and Matching Workship
in Marrakech, the Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting, the conference “On
Money as a Medium of Exchange: KW at 25!” in Santa Barbara, and the Summer
Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance. We would also like to acknowledge
the useful feedback we received from seminar participants at Arizona State University and
the University of Iowa. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect official
positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the
Board of Governors.
1
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
1 Introduction
An agent wanting to borrow money can acquire more of it and at better
terms by pledging collateral to incent repayment. The practice of using
collateral to secure a debt is called hypothecation. The same agent may
further improve the quantity and terms of his loan by granting the creditor
temporary use-rights over the pledged collateral. The practice of re-using
pledged collateral is called rehypothecation.
Because much rehypothecation evidently occurs in the shadow-banking
sector, the true scope of the activity is not easily measured. However, data
available for primary dealers suggest that rehypothecation was large and
growing prior to the 2008 financial crisis. And while the practice appears to
have diminished since the financial crisis, the present value of rehypothecated
assets remains measured in the trillions of dollars; see Singh and Aitken
(2010, Figure 1) and Shkolnik (2015, Figure 11).
The role of collateral in lending arrangements is easy to understand. The
question of why a debtor should prefer a collateralized loan over an outright
sale (and subsequent repurchase) of collateral, on the other hand, is less
straightforward, but is not the question we address here.1 What we want to
know is why–given a collateralized lending arrangement–an additional use-
right over collateral is sometimes transferred to the creditor. Our answer is
that–when collateral is scarce (in the sense of Caballero, 2006)–rehypoth-
ecation is a mechanism that increases the effective supply of collateral by
permitting its reassignment to agencies in the best position to make use of
it.
Selling a borrowed security (or re-using it as collateral) to exploit a trade
that might not otherwise have happened sounds a lot like liquidity provision
to us. Indeed, it is precisely this observation that motivates the title of our
paper. In what follows, we seek to clarify the nature of rehypothecation,
its connection to market liquidity, and how the practice may be affected
by monetary and regulatory policies. To this end, we construct a dynamic
general equilibrium model of monetary exchange with a security that can
potentially serve as collateral in lending arrangements.
In our model, investors holding cash and securities gain random access to
expenditure opportunities, some of which require cash financing and others
for which securities can also be used. Investors with cash-only opportu-
1Monnet and Narajabad (2012) provide a framework for understanding the circum-
stances in which repurchase agreements are preferred to asset sales.
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Figure 1: Rehypothecation
nities and investors with opportunities that can be financed more flexibly
using cash or securities engage in a swap of assets to be reversed at a later
date. In regions of the parameter space where both investors are liquidity
constrained, it makes sense to have cash flowing to the cash investor (in-
vestor A) and securities flowing to the credit investor (investor B), with the
exchange reversed (or otherwise settled) at a later date.
In reality, investor A could be a hedge fund and investor B a dealer
bank. The hedge fund wants to borrow cash, offering government bonds as
collateral.2 Or investor A may be a retail investor holding a margin account
with investor B, a discount broker. The retail investor wants to borrow cash
to buy shares in a company, with the discount broker treating these shares
as collateral for the cash loan.
In Figure 1, the client and broker exchange cash and an asset (denoted
by A). The client uses borrowed cash to purchase a good, service, or security,
denoted by Y. The cash potentially circulates in a chain of transactions and is
ultimately returned. If the asset pledged as collateral can be rehypothecated,
the broker is permitted to re-use it. In the figure, the broker issues an IOU
for Y that is backed by A. As with cash, this security may conceivably
circulate in a collateral chain before it is ultimately returned.3
2Again, we are not asking why a hedge fund in need of cash does not simply sell its
security and reverse the transaction at a later date if so desired.
3We do not consider extended collateral chains in the formal model below, though
such an extension can be easily incorporated without changing the flavor of our reported
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The investors in our model require exchange media to facilitate profitable
exchanges involving untrusting third parties. We model these third parties
as workers and the profitable exchanges as consumption opportunities. That
is, workers want to get paid in cash (sometimes securities) in exchange for
their labor services. Lack of trust (i.e., the absence of fully enforceable
credit) between workers and investors gives rise to inefficient outcomes, as is
standard in the monetary literature. Note that a degree of realism could be
gained by replacing workers in our model with agents who present investors
with profitable investment opportunities, but our central conclusions are not
sensitive to such a modification. Our framework of analysis, therefore, can
be based on a relatively minor adaption of the Lagos and Wright (2005) and
Geromichalos, Licari and Sua´rez-Lledo´ (2007) quasilinear models of money
and asset exchange.
As far as we know, ours is the first dynamic general equilibrium model
brought to bear on the question of rehypothecation. In our model econ-
omy, a low-return monetary instrument coexists with a high-return security
because the former can be used in a wider array of transactions. The equi-
librium real rate of return on money (the inverse of the inflation rate) is
determined by monetary policy. The value of rehypothecation is shown to
be higher in high inflation (high interest rate) economies. We calculate that
permitting unfettered rehypothecation in a 10% inflation regime is worth
over 1% of consumption in perpetuity. The value of rehypothecation is di-
minished in low-inflation, low-interest rate regimes and, indeed, the value
of the practice vanishes at the Friedman rule. The intuition for this latter
result is straightforward: at the Friedman rule, the opportunity cost of car-
rying idle money balances is zero, so that agencies become voluntarily flush
with liquidity. Away from the Friedman rule, our calculations show that
allowing unrestricted rehypothecation can in some cases lower the welfare
cost of inflation up to 70%.
As an empirical matter, the volume of rehypothecation has diminished
substantially in the low-inflation, low-interest rate environment that has
characterized the U.S. economy since the Great Recession (see Shkolnik
2015, Figure 11). An unknown amount of this scaling down is no doubt
attributable to increased risk perception and regulatory control. But as our
theory suggests, the present low-inflation, low-interest rate environment is
almost surely a contributing factor, as the opportunity cost of holding cash
remains relatively low.
results.
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Another contribution of our paper is to demonstrate how real-world poli-
cies designed to regulate rehypothecation can be modeled and studied in a
dynamic general equilibrium framework. To identify the theoretical effect
of regulatory interventions on rehypothecation, we study two general forms
of regulation. The first policy has the flavor of SEC rule 15c3-3 for margin
accounts, which restricts how much collateral a client borrows on margin
can be rehypothecated by a broker-dealer. This policy targets the joint al-
location of money and securities attached with the rehypothecation right.
The amount of borrowed securities that can be rehypothecated depends on
the amount of cash lent. The SEC rule 15c3-3 type of policy is equivalent
to a regulatory haircut on collateral used in bilateral repo contracts.4 The
second policy we examine restricts the rehypothecation right on collateral
without any reference to the cash flowing in the opposite direction. A form
of this latter policy is a law that requires some collateral to be held in segre-
gated accounts, much in the way the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 restricts the
rehypothecation of assets in credit derivatives markets.5
We show that only policies of the first type can be welfare-improving,
while policies of the second type cannot improve welfare and in fact are
typically welfare-reducing. Given the second-best nature of equilibrium out-
comes in our model economy, it is perhaps not surprising to learn that trad-
ing restrictions can sometimes improve welfare. However, the mechanism
through which this effect operates is specific to our model. A restriction
along the lines of SEC rule 15c3-3 bestows a “regulatory premium” on cash,
enhancing the demand for cash, which is inefficiently low in a high-inflation,
high-interest rate economy. Specifically, investors demand more cash to re-
lax regulatory restrictions on future rehypothecation.6 The second policy,
on the other hand, does not have a direct impact on the demand for real cash
balances, so that the welfare consequences are quite different. Our model
makes clear how the details of regulatory design related to the practice of
rehypothecation can matter.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
4See, for example, International Capital Market Association (2012), for the equivalence
of the initial margin and a haircut.
5In particular, swap contracts must now be cleared by central counterparties who are
required to hold collateral in segregated accounts; see Monnet (2011).
6Our result resembles Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2009). In their paper, reserve
requirements enhance the demand for real money balances, which leads to improved risk-
sharing. They note that such a regulation is usually motivated by financial stability
concerns but that, as in our paper, a regulation designed for one purpose may turn out to
have unintended benefits along another dimension.
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physical environment and characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations.
In Section 3, we describe the market structure, the frictions that make ex-
change media necessary, and monetary policy. We formalize the economic
problems that agents solve in Section 4 and characterize a stationary mon-
etary equilibrium. In Section 5, we study the properties of an unregulated
economy, in particular, how the allocation depends on inflation and collat-
eral supply. In Section 6, we evaluate the welfare consequences of real-world
regulations designed to restrict rehypothecation. Section 7 presents a brief
review of some related literature and offers a few concluding remarks.
2 Environment
In this section we describe the physical environment and characterize the set
of Pareto optimal allocations. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite,
t = 0, 1, 2, ..,∞. Each date t is divided into three subperiods, which we label
the morning, afternoon, and evening, respectively.
The economy is populated by two types of infinitely-lived agents labeled
investors and workers. There is a continuum of each type of agent, with
the population mass of each normalized to unity. All agents realize an
idiosyncratic “location shock” in the morning which determines a subsequent
travel itinerary for the remainder of the period. There are two spatially
separated locations. Half of the population of investors and workers travels
to each of the two locations in the afternoon.7 There is no aggregate risk.
All agents reconvene to a central location in the evening.
Agents have preferences defined over afternoon and evening goods. All
goods are nonstorable. Let (cj,t, yj,t) denote the output consumed and pro-
duced in the afternoon in location j = 1, 2 at date t. Let x ∈ R denote
expected consumption (production, if negative) of the evening good. An
investor has preferences represented by
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
0.5u(c1,t) + 0.5u(c2,t) + x
i
t
]
(1)
where u′′ < 0 < u′ and u′(0) = ∞ and 0 < β < 1. Workers have linear
7This is a simplified way to capture trading frictions as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen
(2005).
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preferences, represented by
∞∑
t=0
βt [−0.5y1,t − 0.5y2,t + xwt ] (2)
Thus, our model adopts the quasilinear preference and timing structure of
Lagos and Wright (2005).
Finally, there is a single productive asset in fixed supply–a Lucas tree–that
generates a constant nonstorable income flow ω > 0 at the beginning of each
evening.
A Pareto optimal allocation is a feasible allocation that maximizes a
weighted sum of ex ante utilities (1) and (2). Given that u is strictly concave,
efficiency dictates that c1 is the same for all investors in location 1 and c2
is the same for all investors in location 2. Feasibility requires c1 = y1 and
c2 = y2. Since the disutility of production in the afternoon is linear for
workers, we can interpret (y1, y2) as expected levels of production/disutility.
Clearly, the efficient allocation of afternoon consumption/production sat-
isfies c1 = c2 = y
∗ where u′(y∗) = 1. The resource constraint in the evening
is given by
xi + xw = ω (3)
Since ω > 0 is given, the choice of xw serves only to distribute utility across
investors and workers. Although xw may be positive or negative, it will
typically be positive, as workers need to be compensated in the evening
for their afternoon effort. Workers themselves can produce in the evening
in order to consume, but the net effect on utility is canceled out. In the
aggregate, workers’ evening net transfers are positive, xw > 0, if investors
do not consume all the dividend, i.e., xi < ω. Note that xi may be negative,
which would mean investors produce in the evening to further compensate
workers. Since the total surplus is proportional to u(y∗) − y∗, the ex ante
participation constraints are satisfied for any xw such that y∗ ≤ xw ≤ u(y∗).
3 Market structure and policy
The planning allocation characterized above hints at the pattern of trade
that will prevail in a decentralized setting. Investors want to consume in the
afternoon. They will want to acquire these desired goods and services from
workers, who are in a position to deliver them. Workers must somehow be
7
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compensated for their travails. The requisite compensation can only happen
in the evening, where workers can acquire xw in the form of services from
investors and/or from the income generated by the Lucas tree. The question
is how these trade flows are to be financed.
Investors and workers do not trust each other. As explained in Gale
(1978), the lack of trust necessitates the use of an exchange medium. Fol-
lowing Geromichalos, Licari and Sua´rez-Lledo´ (2007), we assume the exis-
tence of two exchange media: fiat money and a security that constitutes a
claim to the Lucas tree. We assume that workers in location 1 only accept
cash as payment, whereas workers in location 2 are willing to accept both
cash and securities as payment.8 This restriction on payments is simply a
device intended to capture the fact that investors sometimes need cash to
finance purchases and at other times are able to use securities as a means
of finance.9 In what follows, we relabel location 1 as the cash market and
location 2 as the credit market.10
We assume that the afternoon cash and credit markets are competitive.
Let (p1, p2) denote the price of output, measured in units of money, in the
afternoon cash and credit markets, respectively. Let φ2 denote the cum-
dividend real price of securities in the afternoon credit market and let φ3
denote the ex-dividend real price of securities in the evening. Finally, let p3
denote the nominal price of output (transferable utility) in the evening.
Under the assumed market structure, trade flows are financed in the
following manner. Afternoon purchases are financed with investor sales of
money and securities. In the evening, money and securities flow back in
the opposite direction. That is, workers spend their accumulated wealth on
goods and services. Investors rebalance their depleted wealth portfolios in
the act of worker compensation. This trade pattern repeats period after
period. In what follows, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria and so
8See Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2013) for a theory of asset liquidity.
9Note that while the purchases here are modeled as acquisitions of goods and services,
the model could be extended to accommodate the fact that investors typically use cash
and securities to finance acquisitions of different securities.
10The label “credit market” is chosen because the sale of assets here is equivalent to
a fully collateralized lending arrangement. That is, investors could borrow output from
workers in the afternoon, using the security as collateral that is legally seizable in the event
of default. Note that technically, such a collateralized loan arrangement need not violate
our lack of trust assumption. One could imagine, in particular, a mechanical protocol that
executes collateralized loan arrangements among anonymous agents. In fact, the Bitcoin-
related platform Ethereum is a protocol that permits exactly this type of exchange to take
place.
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we drop the time-subscript on variables.
Note that when investors are rebalancing their wealth portfolios in evening
trade, they do not know beforehand which of the two locations they will be
visiting the next afternoon. This would not be an issue if a well-functioning
financial markets were available in the morning. In that case, investors could
just dispose of securities in outright sales if they needed cash and vice-versa
if they wanted to accumulate securities. Moreover, if they needed to borrow
from other investors, they could potentially do so. We assume that these
markets are unavailable to investors in the morning–a restriction meant to
capture the fact that investors are not always in timely contact with central-
ized financial markets. Investors are therefore subject to a form of liquidity
risk. Accumulating low-return cash will turn out to be useful because it
hedges against a liquidity shock–the risk of visiting the cash market (i.e.,
the risk of needing cash to exploit a profitable expenditure opportunity).
Because investors are risk-averse, they will generally have an incentive
to form risk-sharing arrangements. We assume that investors are grouped in
pairs and that each such pairing represents an enduring relationship, where
the two partners serve as if they were in a cooperative, seeking to maximize
the value of their partnership. Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that
when one partner travels to the cash market, the other partner travels to
the credit market. That is, the idiosyncratic uncertainty associated with
travel itineraries is perfectly negatively correlated across the two partners.11
In this setup then, one investor is wanting cash and the other is wanting
securities. The cash flowing to the cash investor is expected to be spent. Of
course, exactly the same logic applies for the securities flowing to the credit
investor. That is, since the two investors trust each other, securities play no
role as collateral within the relationship. The only rationale for reassigning
securities is so that they can be reused, just like cash.
We study two types of policies designed to regulate the rehypotheca-
tion of securities. The first regulatory restriction is modeled after SEC rule
15c3-3 for margin accounts in the United States. This rule specifies that the
securities borrower (cash lender) can rehypothecate borrowed securities only
in proportion to the amount of cash lent. So, for example, if a retail investor
uses $50 of margin to buy $100 of Apple shares from a broker, the broker is
permitted to rehypothecate no more than 140% of the cash loan, that is, $70
worth of Apple shares in this example. The second regulatory restriction is
11On the other hand, note that because workers are risk-neutral, they do not value
insurance.
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modeled after a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, in particular, Title VII,
Section 724, which requires most swap contracts to be cleared through cen-
tral counterparties with some pledged collateral kept in segregated accounts.
That is, the rehypothecation of securities is in this case restricted.
We assume throughout that the supply of fiat money grows at a constant
gross rate µ ≥ β and that new money is injected (or withdrawn) via lump-
sum transfers (or taxes) to the investors in the third subperiod. Let τ denote
the real transfer per investor.
4 Decision-making
4.1 Workers
Because workers have linear preferences, their choices serve primarily to price
money and securities via a set of no-arbitrage-conditions. In what follows,
the only behavior we impose on workers is that they carry no wealth from
an evening to the subsequent morning. This behavior is optimal when µ > β
(when monetary policy is away from the Friedman rule) and without loss of
generality when µ = β.12
To acquire one dollar in the afternoon cash market, a worker must expend
utility 1/p1. This dollar then buys 1/p3 units of output in the evening. Since
there is no discounting across subperiods, a no-arbitrage-condition implies
1/p1 = 1/p3 must hold in equilibrium.
To acquire one dollar in the afternoon credit market, a worker must ex-
pend utility 1/p2. This dollar then buys 1/p3 units of output in the evening.
Since there is no discounting across subperiods, a no-arbitrage-condition
implies 1/p2 = 1/p3. Together, these results imply that p1 = p2 = p3 = p.
To acquire one share of the security in the afternoon credit market, a
worker must expend utility φ2. These shares can be sold for evening output
at price φ3 + ω. Again, because there is no discounting across subperiods, a
12Note that workers have no transactional need for financial assets. Thus, given their
linear preferences, for workers to be willing to acquire financial assets in the evening, they
would have to earn a rate of return of at least 1/β, to compensate for discounting across
periods. Cash earns a rate of return of 1/β at the Friedman rule and less than that
otherwise. As we shall see, when collateral is scarce, securities carry a liquidity premium
and earn a rate of return lower than 1/β.
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no-arbitrage-condition implies
φ2 = φ3 + ω
That is, the afternoon cum-dividend price of securities is equal to the ex-
dividend evening price of securities plus the value of the dividend.
Since workers must be indifferent between being paid in money or secu-
rities in the afternoon credit market, the real rate of return on money and
securities from afternoon to evening must be the same, p2/p3 = (φ3+ω)/φ2.
Since p2 = p3 and φ2 = φ3 + ω, this condition is satisfied. Given these
conditions, it is optimal for workers to passively supply whatever output
is demanded from them in the afternoon, and to spend all their acquired
wealth in each evening.
4.2 Investors
4.2.1 Morning
Let (m, a) denote the money and securities held by an investor at the be-
ginning of the morning. Assuming that investors enter each morning with
identical wealth portfolios, the consolidated assets of two investors in a trad-
ing relationship is (2m, 2a). The location shock is realized in the morning,
one investor in the relationship will have an opportunity to trade in the cash
market and the other will have an opportunity to trade in the credit market.
Before investors travel to their designated locations in the afternoon, they
have an opportunity to rearrange money and securities between them.13
Let (m2, a2) denote the portfolio allocated to the investor traveling to
the credit market, where 2m ≥ m2 ≥ 0 and 2a ≥ a2 ≥ 0. The portfolio
allocated to the investor traveling to the cash market is given residually by
(m1, a1) = (2m−m2, 2a− a2).
Given our setup, we anticipate cash flowing to the cash-investor and
securities flowing to the credit-investor, i.e., m2 ≤ m and a2 ≥ a. Thus, the
13We assume here that investors do not belong to the same enterprise operating from
a consolidated balance sheet. Instead, investors are involved in informal relationships.
They have individual wealth portfolios but they seek to maximize the joint value of the
relationship. In particular, they can commit to any feasible terms they strike in risk-
sharing arrangements.
11
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relevant non-negativity constraints are:
m2 ≥ 0 (4)
2a− a2 ≥ 0 (5)
If m2 < m, then the credit-investor is in effect sending [m−m2] dollars
to the cash-investor. If a2 > a, then the cash-investor is in effect sending
pφ2 [a2 − a] dollars worth of securities to the credit-investor, where pφ2 is
the nominal price of the security in the afternoon. If the value of what
is exchanged is the same, then the transaction replicates what could have
been accomplished through an outright purchase of securities by credit-
investors in a morning securities market, if such a market existed. But
because investors in a relationship trust each other, a degree of unsecured
credit is possible. If [m−m2] < pφ2 [a2 − a] , then the cash-investor is a
net creditor to the credit-investor (the money loan is overcollateralized). If
[m−m2] > pφ2 [a2 − a] , then the credit-investor is a net creditor to the
cash-investor (the money loan is undercollateralized).
One way to map our model into reality is to interpret the investor part-
nership as the type of relationship that is formed between different broker-
dealers, or broker-dealers and other securities lenders (e.g., central banks,
pension funds, insurers). Think of the investor traveling to the cash market
as a client and the investor traveling to the credit market as a broker-dealer.
The client wants to “borrow” [m−m2] dollars from his margin account
held with the broker-dealer, and is willing to “pledge” securities worth up to
pφ2 [a2 − a] dollars as “collateral.” As is the case in reality, the broker-dealer
agreement permits the rehypothecation of collateral for use in proprietary
trades. Clearly, if the value of cash and securities passing hands is not the
same, then some amount of unsecured credit is involved. We assume that
broker-dealers and their clients can be trusted to repay unsecured debt. In
reality, reputational concerns (the threat of punishments for default) can
support a degree of unsecured credit. In any case, the credit arrangements
described here are unwound each evening. If the broker-dealer rehypoth-
ecated the client’s collateral in the afternoon, either in a short-sale or as
collateral for a proprietary lending arrangement (with workers), then the
collateral–or its value equivalent–is returned in the evening.
Investors in a trading relationship may face regulatory constraints on
how they can use borrowed securities. The SEC rule 15c3-3 is modeled as
follows,
θ [m−m2] ≥ pφ2 [a2 − a] (R1)
12
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
where θ ≥ 0 is a policy parameter. The regulatory constraint (R1) is a
requirement on cash margin for borrowed securities with a rehypothecation
right. In particular, it restricts the value of borrowed securities that can be
rehypothecated by the credit-investor to be a multiple of the value of money
lent to the cash-investor. In general, think of the cash-investor depositing
all his securities with the credit-investor and placing a fraction of these in a
segregated account. Securities in this segregated account may still serve as
collateral for the cash loan but cannot be reused by the credit-investor, i.e.,
they do not carry rehypothecation rights. The regulatory constraint places
a limit on the amount of securities that can be rehypothecated.14
Alternatively, a regulation in the form of Title VII, Section 724 of the
Dodd-Frank Act is modeled here as
ϑa ≥ [a2 − a] (R2)
for some 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ 1. If ϑ = 1, then the creditor-investor may make full use
of the securities he borrows from the cash-investor. If ϑ = 0, then all of the
borrowed securities are effectively held in a segregated account–they may
not be spent (rehypothecated).
4.2.2 Afternoon
Recall that (2m, 2a) represents the combined morning asset position of two
investors in a relationship. Recall as well that (m2, a2) denotes the portfolio
allocated to the investor traveling to the credit market in the afternoon. Let
(m′, a′) denote the investors’ combined asset position entering the evening.
Investors’ combined expenditure on afternoon goods and services can-
not exceed their combined wealth, net of what they wish to carry into the
evening. Thus, the afternoon flow budget constraint for investors is given
by:
2m−m′ + pφ2(2a− a′)− py1 − py2 ≥ 0 (6)
Individually, investors are subject to liquidity constraints depending on their
travel itinerary. The cash-investor is subject to the following liquidity con-
straint:
2m−m2 − py1 ≥ 0 (7)
14In Canada, rehypothecation is apparently prohibited (Maurin, 2015) and so θ = 0. In
the U.K., there are apparently no legal limits to rehypothecation, in which case θ = ∞.
In the U.S., SEC15c3-3 sets θ = 1.4.
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while the credit-investor is subject to:
m2 + pφ2a2 − py2 ≥ 0 (8)
Condition (7) restricts the cash-investor’s expenditures in the afternoon,
py1 so that they do not exceed his available cash, m1 = 2m − m2. Since
money holdings cannot be negative, m1 ≥ 0. This, in turn, implies 2m ≥ m2.
Note that m1 = 0 cannot be optimal in a monetary equilibrium (it would
imply y1 = 0) and hence, 2m > m2 as anticipated above when deriving
(4). As well, a1 = (2a − a2) ≥ 0 implies 2a ≥ a2, as specified by (5).
Since y2 ≥ 0, the liquidity constraint of the credit-investor (8) imposes a
non-negativity restriction on his combined money and securities holdings.
That is, afternoon expenditures, py2 cannot exceed the total value of assets
under his control, m2 + pφ2a2. In addition to this we need to impose the
non-negativity constraints m2 ≥ 0 and a2 ≥ 0, though only the former is
potentially binding. Together, all these non-negativity constraints imply
that consolidated money and securities holdings brought into the evening
are also non-negative, i.e., m′, a′ ≥ 0.
Since m′ is the investors’ consolidated cash position brought into the
evening and 2m − m2 − py1 is the cash brought into the evening by the
cash-investor, the difference between these two objects represents the cash
brought into the evening by the credit-investor. This object too must be
non-negative,
m′ − [2m−m2 − py1] ≥ 0 (9)
A similar argument applied to the credit-investor’s securities holdings im-
plies:
a′ − [2a− a2] ≥ 0 (10)
Recall that a′ represents the investors’ consolidated security holdings as they
enter the evening. The difference 2a−a2 represents the (unspent) securities
held by the cash-investor or, equivalently, the value of his securities deposited
in a segregated account with the credit-investor, with no rehypothecation
rights. Thus, (10) restricts the credit-investor’s security holdings to be non-
negative.
The following result allows us to omit (8) from the set of restrictions
faced by the agent. (Note that proofs to all lemmas and propositions are
available in Appendix B).
Lemma 1 The liquidity constraint (8) is implied by restrictions (6), (7),
(9) and (10)
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4.2.3 Evening
Let (m+, a+) denote the money and securities carried by an investor from
the evening into the next period after investors settle the terms of their risk-
sharing agreement reached in the morning. Again, since the relationship is
assumed to solve the problem of maximizing joint welfare, and since the two
investors are ex ante identical, symmetry demands that each investor enters
the morning with an identical wealth portfolio. With this in mind, we can
write each investor’s evening budget constraint as follows,
x = (φ3 + ω) a
′/2 + (1/p)(m′/2−m+)− φ3a+ + τ (11)
Recall that τ is the real value of new money injections (or tax, if negative)
per investor.
4.2.4 Investor choices
Let B(2m, 2a) denote the joint value of an investor relationship in the morn-
ing with combined assets (2m, 2a). Let V (m′, a′) denote the joint value of
this relationship entering the evening with combined assets (m′, a′). The
value functions {B, V } must satisfy the recursion:
B(2m, 2a) ≡ max
y1,y2,m2,a2,m′,a′
{
u(y1) + u(y2) + V (m
′, a′)
}
(12)
subject to (R1), (R2) (6), (7) and the non-negativity constraints (4), (5),
(9) and (10).
Note that when ϑ = 1, the non-negativity constraint (5) corresponds to
regulatory constraint (R2). When ϑ < 1, the non-negativity constraint (5) is
implied by the regulatory constraint (R2), so that the former is redundant.
Recall that by Lemma 1, (8) is implied by the other constraints.
In the evening, the joint problem solved by investors is given by,
V (m′, a′) ≡ max
m+,a+
{
(φ3 + ω) a
′ + (m′ − 2m+)/p− φ32a+ + 2τ + βB(2m+, 2a+)
}
(13)
There are also the non-negativity constraints m+, a+ ≥ 0, but we antici-
pate that these will not bind for investors in the evening.15 The optimality
conditions associated with investor decisions are recorded in Appendix A.
15Investors will want to rebuild their asset positions in order to finance their consump-
tion expenditures in the following afternoon.
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4.2.5 Equilibrium conditions
We restrict attention to stationary allocations in which real quantities and
prices remain constant while nominal quantities and prices grow at rate
µ > β. The Friedman rule monetary policy is written as µ = β, but should
be understood to mean limµ↘β µ.16
The equilibrium is characterized mathematically in Appendix A. For
convenience, we record the key economic restrictions in the body of this
section. The first condition determines the level of economic activity in the
afternoon cash market,
µ = β[u′(y1) + θpχ1/2] (EQM1)
where χ1 ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the regulatory
constraint (R1).
The second condition places a restriction on the equilibrium security
price and the level of economic activity in the afternoon credit market,
φ3 = β(φ3 + ω)[(1 + ϑ)u
′(y2) + (1− ϑ)− ϑpχ1]/2 (EQM2)
Let ζ1 and ζ2 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with (9) and
(10), respectively. That is, if ζ1 > 0 and ζ2 > 0, then the credit investor
brings no cash or securities into the evening. The relevant economic restric-
tion for afternoon economic activity in the credit market is given by,
u′(y2)− 1 = pζ1 = ζ2/φ2 (EQM3)
Hence, either both (9) and (10) are slack or they both bind.
Let ζ3 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (4). In Appendix
A, we demonstrate that the following restriction applies,
pζ3 = u
′(y1)− u′(y2) + θpχ1 (EQM4)
If ζ3 > 0, then optimal risk-sharing requires the credit investor to lend
all his money to cash investor in the morning, i.e., m2 = 0 and m1 = 2M.
Any remaining wedge in consumption between the cash and credit investor
16At the Friedman rule, the price level and aggregate real balances are indeterminate,
which is why we focus on the equilibrium that arises in the limit, as µ approaches β from
above.
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will then be determined on whether the regulatory constraint (R1) binds or
not.
Let χ2 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (R2) which, recall,
implies the non-negativity constraint (5). In Appendix A, we derive the
following restriction,
pχ1 + χ2/φ2 = u
′(y2)− 1 (EQM5)
Thus, if either of the regulatory constraints bind, activity in the afternoon
credit market is constrained (y2 < y
∗). When ϑ = 1, it is still possible for
χ2 > 0 but in this case the constraint binds not for regulatory reasons, but
rather because the non-negativity constraint (5) binds.
We now invoke the market-clearing conditions m = M and a = 1. Cash-
investors spend all of their cash (when µ = β, they weakly prefer to do so).
Thus, (7) holds with equality. Together with the market-clearing conditions,
we have:
2M −m2 = py1 (EQM6)
Finally, the regulatory constraints need to be satisfied in equilibrium. Using
the market clearing conditions and (EQM5) we obtain equilbrium expres-
sions for the regulatory constraints (R1) and (R2):
a2 − 1 ≤ (θ/φ2)(y1 −M/p) (EQM7)
a2 − 1 ≤ ϑ (EQM8)
Clearly, both constraints cannot bind simultaneously, except in the non-
generic case φ2ϑ = θ(y1 −M/p). Note that if m2 = 0 (a typical case) then
(EQM7) simplifies to a2 − 1 ≤ (θ/φ2)(y1/2).
5 Unregulated economy
In this section, we describe analytically the properties of the equilibrium
allocation in an unregulated economy. That is, we consider an economy in
which the regulatory constraints on rehypothecation do not bind or are not
imposed. In particular, assume that θ is high enough so that (EQM7) does
not bind (i.e., χ1 = 0) and that ϑ = 1. Now (EQM8) binds only when (5)
binds, so that χ2 > 0 in this case reflects a binding short sale constraint,
and not a binding regulatory constraint.
We start by stating two important properties of the unregulated econ-
omy, which are standard in monetary economies. Then, we characterize how
the equilibrium is affected by the availability (or shortage) of collateral.
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Proposition 1 Operating monetary policy at the Friedman rule (µ = β),
implements the efficient allocation, y1 = y2 = y
∗.
In this economy, it is optimal to use lump-sum taxes to finance a deflation
to a point that sets the nominal interest rate to zero. To see this, note that
condition (EQM1) for χ1 = 0 implies µ = βu
′(y1) when χ1 = 0. Thus
y1 = y
∗ when µ = β. Condition (EQM3) implies u′(y2)− 1 = pζ1 ≥ 0. Since
u′(y∗) = 1, condition (EQM4) implies pζ3 = 1−u′(y2) ≥ 0. These latter two
conditions imply u′(y2) = 1, so that y2 = y∗ and χ2 = 0.
Proposition 1 is important because it asserts that under an optimal mon-
etary policy, investors are flush with liquidity so that the use of additional
securities as exchange media is redundant. In particular, rehypothecation
has no private or social value when the nominal interest rate is zero. By con-
tinuity, one would expect rehypothecation to have little value in relatively
low-inflation (low-interest rate) regimes.
Proposition 2 The level of economic activity in the cash-market y1 is strictly
decreasing in the rate of inflation µ.
Because inflation acts as a tax on cash transactions, higher inflation
means lower output in the cash-market. That y1 is strictly decreasing in the
inflation rate µ follows directly from condition (EQM1) when χ1 = 0.
The effect of inflation on y2 depends on the supply of collateral securities,
as indexed by the parameter ω. Consider the creditor-investor’s liquidity
constraint (8), m2 + pφ2a2− py2 ≥ 0. Let us assume y2 = y∗ and then verify
the conditions under which this result is valid.
Assume for the moment that securities are not rehypothecated, that
is, ϑ = 0 so that a2 = 1. Moreover, assume (and later verify) that the
creditor-investor lends all his money to the cash-investor, so that m2 = 0.
From the market-clearing condition (EQM6), p = 2M/y1. From condition
(EQM2), we see that when χ1 = 0 and y2 = y
∗, the security is priced at its
fundamental value,
φ∗2 = φ
∗
3 + ω = ω/(1− β) (14)
Combining these results with the liquidity constraint (8) implies that the
requisite condition is φ∗2 ≥ y∗, or ω ≥ (1− β)y∗. Thus, if the income gener-
ated by the asset is sufficiently large (so that the market value of collateral
securities is sufficiently high), then the creditor-investor can finance the ef-
ficient level of expenditure y∗ exclusively with his own securities. This, in
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turn, implies that m2 = 0 is part of an efficient risk-sharing arrangement as
µ > β implies that the cash-investor remains liquidity constrained.
Definition 1 Define ω∗ ≡ (1−β)y∗. An economy is said to be collateral-rich
if ω ≥ ω∗ and collateral-poor if ω < ω∗.
Intuitively, a collateral-rich economy is one in which the market value of
collateral securities is sufficiently high as to render rehypothecation super-
fluous (the efficient level of output y2 = y
∗ is achievable even when ϑ = 0).
In this model then, inflation can have no impact on the level of activity in
the credit market when the economy is collateral-rich. Moreover, note that
ω∗ is independent of µ.
Let us now consider collateral-poor economies (and assuming µ > β).
We conjecture that y2 = y
∗ will continue to be implementable over some
range [ωˆ, ω∗). Assume (and later verify) that m2 = 0, so that p = 2M/y1.
Since y2 = y
∗, we have φ2 = φ∗2. The creditor-investor’s liquidity constraint
(8) therefore is satisfied as a weak inequality if and only if φ∗2a2 ≥ y∗, or
ωa2 ≥ (1 − β)y∗ = ω∗.17 That is, y2 = y∗ appears to be feasible even for
ω < ω∗, but only if rehypothecation is possible, i.e., a2 > 1. For lower values
of ω in this range, greater levels of rehypothecation (a1 − 1) are needed to
support a level of financing sufficient to support y2 = y
∗. In our model,
which features only bilateral relationships, the maximum rehypothecation
“multiplier” is (a2/a) = 2. That is, since a = 1 in equilibrium, the maximum
amount of rehypothecated securities is a2 = 2. Thus, the creditor-investor’s
liquidity constraint will remain slack for any ω ≥ (1/2)ω∗ ≡ ωˆ < ω∗. Since
y2 = y
∗ can be financed without cash, it remains privately optimal to send
all money to the cash-investor, i.e., m2 = 0. Note that ωˆ is also independent
of µ.
Proposition 3 If ω ≥ ωˆ, then y2 = y∗ for any µ ≥ β.
For ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗), the quantity of rehypothecated securities [a2 − 1] =
[ω∗/ω − 1] ≥ 0 is a decreasing function of ω. So, as we decrease ω from ω∗
to ωˆ, the volume of rehypothecation increases until its upper limit is reached
a2 = 2 at ω = ωˆ. For ω < ωˆ, the creditor-investor’s liquidity constraint (8)
17By Lemma 1 and the derivations in Appendix A, this situation arises when constraints
(9) and (10) do not bind. Note that constraint (6) always binds, while, in the absence of
regulation, constraint (7) binds whenever µ > β.
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is satisfied with equality, i.e., constraints (9) and (10) bind, and y2 < y
∗.
To see this, assume that m2 = 0 (ζ3 > 0) which, from condition (EQM4)
will be true so long as y2 > y1. Then, if (8) is satisfied with equality, the
creditor-investor spends all of his securities in the afternoon, so that ζ2 > 0.
By condition (EQM3), ζ2 > 0 implies y2 < y
∗.
Definition 2 An economy is said to have a collateral shortage if y2 < y
∗.
Economies for which ω ∈ [0, ωˆ) experience a collateral shortage. Note
that collateral-poor economies in the range ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗) do not suffer from
a collateral shortage because rehypothecation “stretches out” the limited
supply of collateral in a manner sufficient to relax the afternoon liquidity
constraint.
Let us now further examine the properties of the model when ω < ωˆ.
Using condition (EQM2) together with χ1 = 0 and the fact that u
′(y2) > 1,
we derive the equilibrium securities price,
φ2 =
[
1
1− βu′(y2)
]
ω > φ∗2 and φ3 =
[
βu′(y2)
1− βu′(y2)
]
ω > φ∗3 (15)
where φ∗2 and φ∗3 are defined in (14). Here we have the familiar result that a
scarce collateral asset is priced above its fundamental value. The magnitude
[u′(y2) − 1] ≥ 0 measures the liquidity premium on the security, vanishing
only when y2 = y
∗. Note that (15) defines an equilibrium lower bound for
y2, i.e., u
′(y2) < 1/β.
Since y2 < y
∗ implies the constraints (9) and (10) bind, the creditor-
investor’s liquidity constraint (8) is satisfied with equality and we have
m2/p + φ2a2 − y2 = 0. Here, m2 = 0 as long as ζ3 > 0. By condition
(EQM4) and χ1 = 0,
pζ3 = u
′(y1)− u′(y2) ≥ 0 (16)
so that ζ3 > 0 as long as y1 < y2. Since the cash-investor has no use of the
security, he lends it all to the creditor-investor (a2 = 2). Using the pricing
function for φ2 in (15), the credit-investor’s liquidity constraint implies that
y2(ω) < y
∗ is determined by,[
1− βu′(y2)
]
y2 − 2ω = 0
from which we derive
y′2(ω) =
2
[1− βu′(y2)]− y2βu′′(y2) > 0 (17)
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Thus, the credit investor’s purchases y2 decline as ω (and the price of secu-
rities) declines. Since y1(µ), which is determined by condition (EQM1) for
a given µ, is independent of ω, condition (16) suggests that there exists a
critical value 0 < ω0(µ) < ωˆ such that y1(µ) = y2(ω0), in which case ζ3 = 0.
Note that since u(y1) = µ/β by (EQM1) and u
′(y2) < 1/β by (15), the case
y1(µ) = y2(ω0) can only exist when µ < 1. Hence, when µ ≥ 1, we obtain
y1(µ) < y2 always.
For µ < 1 and ω < ω0(µ) the liquidity constraint for the credit investor
begins to bind more tightly than the cash investor. To prevent this from
happening, the optimal risk-sharing arrangement at this point now involves
setting m2 > 0 (ζ3 = 0). This is, it is now optimal for the creditor-investor
to keep some cash on hand, rather than lending it all to the cash-investor.
At this point, the liquidity constraint for the creditor-investor (8) is given
by m2/p+ φ2a2 − y2 = 0 with m2/p > 0.
As long as µ < 1, since ζ3 ≥ 0 and y1(µ) is fixed for a given µ, we have
y2 = y1(µ) for all ω ≤ ω0(µ). Since the liquidity constraint (8) holds with
equality, we have m2/p = y1(µ) − φ2a2, where a2 = 2. From (EQM6) we
have m2/p = 2M/p− y1(µ). Together, these two restrictions imply
p =
M
y1(µ)− φ2 (18)
where φ2 is given by (15) with y2 = y1(µ). Thus, for ω ≤ ω0(µ), the effect
of a lower ω is to lower the security price φ2 and increase the price-level,
without any effect on either y1 or y2 (the only effect of lower ω is to lower
consumption in the evening). Since m2/p = y1(µ)−2φ2, the effect of a lower
ω is to increase the real cash balances (m2/p) allocated to the credit investor.
In the limit, as ω = 0, both investors become de facto cash-investors and
both simply divide their cash evenly between themselves. Finally, note that
the critical value ω0(µ) is decreasing in µ.
The results derived above are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If µ ∈ [β, 1), there exists 0 < ω0(µ) < ωˆ such that y2 =
y1(µ) < y
∗ for all ω ∈ (0, ω0(µ)]. If µ ∈ [β, 1) and ω ∈ [ω0(µ), ωˆ), or µ ≥ 1
and ω ∈ (0, ωˆ), then y1(µ) < y2 < y∗, where y2 is an increasing function of
ω and is independent of µ. For ω ≥ ωˆ, y1(µ) < y2 = y∗ for any µ ≥ β.
In the unregulated economy, the typical case is y1 < y2, which implies
m2 = 0, i.e., cash is not allocated to the credit-investor. Whether the credit-
investor obtains the first-best level of consumption depends on whether the
21
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
dividend is high enough. When monetary policy is deflationary and the
dividend is low enough, the partnership allocates some cash to the credit-
investor, m2 > 0, and both investors obtain the same consumption, i.e.,
y1 = y2.
6 Regulating rehypothecation
In this section we study the effects of imposing regulatory constraints on
rehypothecation, as modeled by (R1) and (R2). As noted above, both type of
regulations cannot bind at the same time, so we consider each separately. As
we shall see, these regulations bind only in certain regions of the parameter
space.
Proposition 5 If µ = β or ω ≥ ω∗ then the regulatory constraints (R1)
and (R2) do not bind (χ1 = χ2 = 0) .
Regulating rehypothecation can only be consequential in environments
where the practice is essential. Since rehypothecation is not essential in
collateral-rich economies or at the Friedman rule, we restrict attention to
collateral-poor economies, ω < ω∗ and monetary policies for which µ >
β. Note that restricting attention to this region of the parameter space is
only necessary and not sufficient to guarantee that one of the regulatory
constraints will bind.
6.1 SEC15c3-3 regulation
We first study the effect of imposing the SEC15c3-3 type regulation as mod-
eled in (R1). Set ϑ = 1 so that χ2 now becomes the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the non-negativity constraint (5), i.e., 2a− a ≥ 0.
Consider a collateral-poor economy for which there is no collateral short-
age, ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗). In this case (by Proposition 3) y2 = y∗ in the absence of
regulation and [a2 − 1] = [ω∗/ω − 1] ∈ [0, 2] measures the level of rehypoth-
ecation. Assume, for the moment, that χ1 = χ2 = 0. Since y2 = y
∗ and since
µ > β, we have m2 = 0 and p = 2M/y1. Moreover, φ2 = φ
∗
2. Combining
these restrictions with (EQM7) yields the inequality,
θ ≥ 2(ω
∗ − ω)
(1− β)y1(µ) ≡ Θ(ω, µ)
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Thus, the regulatory constraint (R1) remains slack for any θ ≥ Θ(ω, µ).
Notice that Θ(ω, µ) is decreasing in ω and increasing in µ. For higher levels
of ω the value of collateral securities increases, permitting the regulatory
constraint to tighten (θ to decline) without hampering activity in the credit
market. A higher rate of inflation reduces the real demand for money bal-
ances y1, which increases the price-level. As the nominal value of securities
pφ2 increases and as the nominal supply of cash M is fixed at a point in
time, the regulatory constraint must be relaxed to permit the same amount
of money to support a higher nominal value of rehypothecation.
Suppose then that ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗) and that θ = Θ(ω, µ), so that y1(µ) < y2 =
y∗. Now consider tightening the regulatory restriction on rehypothecation
θ < Θ(ω, µ) so that χ1 > 0, i.e., θ(M − m2) − pφ2(a2 − 1) = 0. What
effect does this binding regulation have on the allocation? To answer this
question, we make use of the following result,
Lemma 2 Let θ ≥ 1. If the regulatory constraint (R1) binds then the
creditor-investor lends all his cash to the cash-investor (m2 = 0).
In words, the lemma above states that if the credit investor would like
to rehypothecate more securities but is prevented by regulation from doing
so then, if the constraint does not bind too tightly (θ ≥ 1), the optimal risk-
sharing arrangement between the two investors entails the cash investor
holding all available cash at the end of the morning. Note that θ ≥ 1 here
is only sufficient and not necessary. In particular, the result may continue
to hold for θ < 1, but for θ is sufficiently small, the regulatory constraint
binds to a point where leaving some cash with the credit investor (m2 > 0)
is desirable. Note that in the United States, SEC rule 15c3-3 stipulates
θ = 1.4.
Thus, assume θ ≥ 1 so that by Lemma 2, m2 = 0 and p = 2M/y1. Note
that y1 is now affected by the regulation through condition (EQM1). In
particular, one effect of lowering θ (tightening the regulatory constraint) is
to increase the demand for real money balances so that y1 rises. Evidently,
reducing the proportion of securities that can be rehypothecated relative to
the cash loan induces investors to want more cash to relax the regulatory
constraint. This form of regulation therefore results in a regulatory premium
for cash. Given that the supply of money is fixed at any point in time, the
effect is to put downward pressure on the price-level. Since χ1 > 0, by
(EQM5), the effect of a binding regulatory constraint is to lower the level
of economic activity in the afternoon credit market, y2 < y
∗.
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The effect on economic welfare from this type of regulation is rather
interesting. Away from the Friedman rule, risk-sharing is inefficient. For
the parameterization considered above, y1 < y2 = y
∗ when the regulatory
constraint is slack. The effect of tightening the regulation here is to increase
y1 at the expense of y2. Since y2 is close to its efficient level, the welfare loss
from a small decline in y2 is of second-order. In contrast, because y1 is far
from optimal, an increase in y1 has a first-order effect on welfare. Therefore,
it is possible that legislation of this form has the effect of increasing ex ante
investor welfare.
6.2 Title VII Section 724 Dodd-Frank regulation
We now study the effect of imposing the Dodd-Frank type regulation as
modeled in (R2), when ϑ ∈ [0, 1). Since we do not consider both regulatory
constraints operating at the same time (only one of them can bind), assume
χ1 = 0 in what follows.
Let us begin by considering a collateral-poor economy for which there is
no collateral shortage, ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗). In this case (by Proposition 3) y2 = y∗
in the absence of regulation and [a2 − 1] = [ω∗/ω − 1] ∈ [0, 2] measures the
level of rehypothecation. Combine this latter measure [a2 − 1] = [ω∗/ω − 1]
with (EQM8) to derive the inequality,
ϑ ≥
[
ω∗
ω
− 1
]
≡ Γ(ω) for ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗]
Thus, Γ(ω) represents the most severe form the regulatory constraint
can take without binding; that is, (R2) remains slack for any ϑ ≥ Γ(ω).
Notice that Γ(ω) is decreasing in ω and independent of µ. Moreover,
Γ(ωˆ) = 1 and Γ(ω∗) = 0. For higher levels of ω the value of collateral
increases, permitting a greater fraction of the outstanding market capital-
ization of collateral securities to be held in segregated accounts without
hampering activity in the credit market.
When ω < ωˆ, the non-negativity constraint (5) binds in the unregulated
economy. Thus, (R2) binds for any ϑ ∈ [0, 1].
In the following proposition we show that, as long as the dividend is high
enough, tightening the Dodd-Frank regulatory constraint (decreasing ϑ) al-
ways reduces welfare. When there is deflation and dividends are low enough,
so that both types of investors get the same allocation in the unregulated
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economy, the Dodd-Frank type regulation is innocuous.
Proposition 6 If ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗) and ϑ < Γ(ω), or if µ ∈ [β, 1) and ω ∈ (0, ωˆ),
or µ ≥ 1 and ω ∈ (0, ωˆ), for any ϑ ∈ [0, 1], then y1 < y2 < y∗, with
y1 independent of ϑ and y2 strictly decreasing in ϑ. If ω ∈ (0, ω0(µ)) and
µ ∈ [β, 1) then y1 = y2 < y∗ and independent of ϑ.
Unlike the SEC15c3-3 regulation studied earlier, the Dodd-Frank type
regulation studied here has no impact on the demand for real money bal-
ances. That is, cash cannot be used to relax the legislated need to segregate
collateral under (R2).
Finally, because the Dodd-Frank regulation confers no regulatory pre-
mium for cash, it does not relax the cash-constraint for the cash-investor;
i.e., y1 remains unaffected by ϑ. On the other hand, tightening the regula-
tion (lowering ϑ) has either no effect or, more typically, contracts the level of
economic activity in the afternoon credit market. Thus, in our environment,
tightening the Dodd-Frank style regulation can never improve welfare. In
fact, except in deflationary, low-dividend economies, the regulation always
reduces welfare.
6.3 Numerical analysis
We further study the effects of the SEC15c3-3 regulation and its interaction
with inflation using numerical methods. To this end, assume U(c) = ln c,
β = 0.96 and ω = 0.015. This parameterization implies ωˆ = 0.02, so we
will be analyzing an economy with collateral-shortage. We vary regula-
tory tightness parameter θ assuming µ = 1. When we vary the inflation
rate µ, we fix θ = 1.05. Throughout, we maintain ϑ = 1. In all cases
considered, we obtain ζ3 > 0 and thus, m2 = 0. Welfare is measured as
the equivalent afternoon-consumption compensation relative to the first-
best allocation. That is, how much an investor would have to be compen-
sated every period, in terms of afternoon consumption, in order to be in-
different between living in the corresponding economy and the first-best.
Given log-utility the welfare cost simplifies to the proportion ∆ solving
ln(1+∆) = W (y∗, y∗)−W (y1, y2), where the function W is the investor’s ex
ante period-utility associated with an equilibrium allocation (y1, y2). Ana-
lytically, we obtain W (y1, y2) ≡ 0.5[ln y1 + ln y2 − y1 − y2] + ω.
Figures 2 and 3 show the effects of tightening the regulatory constraint,
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Figure 2: Effects of SEC15c3-3 Regulation on Rehypothecation and Prices
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i.e., reducing θ. The x-axis of each figure is in terms of 1/θ, so that we
tighten the constraint as we move to the right.
Figure 2 consists of four panels showing the effects of θ on (χ1, χ2), p,
a2−1 and φ3, respectively.18 For θ sufficiently high, the regulatory constraint
does not bind (χ1 = 0); since this is a low-dividend economy, y2 < y
∗ and
thus, χ2 > 0, that is, all securities are allocated to the credit-investor. For
θ low enough, the regulatory constraint binds, χ1 > 0. Note that there is
a range of values of θ, for which the regulatory constraint binds, while all
securities remain assigned to the credit investor. That is, if θ is low, but not
too low, it is possible for the restriction on rehypothecation to bind, while
the volume of securities rehypothecated remains the same. This is possible
since the value of securities φ3 decreases, which allows the partnership to
continue satisfying the regulatory constraint at a2 = 2. In this region, φ3
decreases as we lower θ since the premium on securities dictated by the
18Recall that, since ϑ = 1, χ2 now stands for the Lagrange multiplier on the non-
negativity constraint (5) instead of the regulatory constraint (R2).
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Figure 3: Welfare Cost of SEC15c3-3 Regulation
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constraint a − a2 ≥ 0 becomes less important as the regulatory constraint
becomes tighter (i.e., χ2 decreases as θ decreases). Eventually, however, for
θ sufficiently low, we obtain χ2 = 0 and a2 < 1. That is, the regulatory
constraint is tight enough that the value of the cash loan can no longer
support allocating all the securities to the credit-investor. As we lower
θ further the regulatory constraint binds more tightly and securities start
carrying a higher premium.
Figure 3 shows welfare as a function of θ. There is always a welfare
loss relative to the first-best due to monetary policy being away from the
Friedman rule, µ > β. As the regulation binds, welfare gets closer to the
first-best, so that restricting rehypothecation for this parameterization im-
proves welfare. As we discussed above, restricting rehypothecation brings
the allocations of the cash-investor and the credit-investor closer together,
improving risk-sharing. However, as implied by (EQM4), if the regulation
is too tight (θ too low and thus, χ1 too high), then it is possible to have
y1 > y2, and so welfare can be lower than in the unregulated case.
Figure 4 shows the effects of increasing inflation. In an unregulated econ-
omy, monetary policy directly affects the consumption of the cash-investor:
y1 is decreasing in µ. However, given that all the cash is allocated to the
cash-investor and all the securities to the credit-investor, consumption of
the credit-investor is unaffected by inflation. In contrast, in an economy
subject to restrictions on rehypothecation, the effects of increasing inflation
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Figure 4: Effects of Inflation on Reypothecation and Prices
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are similar to those of tightening the regulatory constraint: increasing µ
raises the prices level, which in turn, tightens the regulatory constraint and
thus, works similarly to lowering θ.
Figure 5 shows welfare for a given inflation rate relative to the first-best
(which is implemented at the Friedman rule, µ = β). It compares the cases
of no partnership, unregulated partnership and regulated partnership.19 The
cost of 10% inflation in the no partnership case is in the range of costs de-
rived in previous studies that also abstract from bargaining frictions (e.g.,
Lucas, 2000 and Rocheteau and Wright, 2004).20 The value of allowing the
practice of rehypothecation is roughly the distance between the no partner-
ship and unregulated cases. As we can see, rehypothecation, which allows
for risk-sharing between investors in a partnership, is especially useful in
19In the no partnership case, individual investors go at it alone. This case is equivalent
to setting ϑ = 0.
20Assuming bargaining over the terms of trade between investors and workers can in-
crease the cost of inflation significantly—see Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007).
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Figure 5: Welfare Cost of Inflation
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high inflation economies. In our example, the welfare gain is about 1.1% of
consumption when inflation is 10%. For most inflation rates, allowing for
unrestricted rehypothecation reduces the welfare cost of inflation by about
70%. When µ is very close to β this reduction is a bit lower: it goes down
to 50% when µ = β
Why do the absolute gains from rehypothecation increase with inflation?
In the no partnership case, both types of investors use cash to finance after-
noon consumption. In some cases, the credit-investor has excess assets–in
fact, for our parameterization, he consumes the first-best. When we allow for
partnerships, cash flows to the cash-investor, who is in higher need of liquid-
ity, at the cost of lowering the consumption of the credit-investor somewhat.
This is why rehypothecation improves welfare, as explained above. Now,
when we allow for rehypothecation, as we increase inflation, the marginal
value of the extra unit of cash flowing to the cash-investor increases, while
consumption for the credit-investor remains unaffected. Thus, the value of
the partnership increases.
The absolute gains from restricting rehypothecation also increase with
inflation, as the SEC15c3-3 type regulation mitigates the inefficiency of a
low rate of return on cash. At 10% inflation, setting θ = 1.05 yields a further
0.1% welfare gain. Although the welfare gain from restricting rehypotheca-
tion is an order of magnitude lower than altogether allowing the practice,
the gain is still sizeable.
29
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
7 Discussion
Our paper is related to several other works studying the role of rehypotheca-
tion on improving the allocation of liquidity, such as Kahn and Park (2015)
and Maurin, Monnet and Gottardi (2015). These authors study rehypoth-
ecation as an optimal contracting problem, stressing different frictions in
the economy. For example, in Kahn and Park (2015), collateral is needed
to solve an agency problem, whereas it is needed in our model to solve a
commitment problem.21 Kahn and Park (2015) emphasize the role of risk
in collateral-return (repo fails). Maurin (2015) also demonstrates how rehy-
pothecation risk can diminish the benefits of enhanced liquidity provision.
Muley (2016) is the only other paper we are aware of that, like ours, tackles
the question of how monetary policy interacts with the practice of rehypoth-
ecation. Among other things, he finds that using interest on reserves may
be preferable to open market operations when collateral is scarce.22
Unlike the papers cited above, we study the role of rehypothecation on
liquidity allocation in a dynamic monetary model. We think a monetary
model is appropriate to study rehypothecation because the practice is fun-
damentally related to liquidity creation. In particular, the rehypothecation
of private assets must compete with liquidity substitutes, primarily in the
form of government money and debt. Among other things, we are able to
use our model to address the question of how monetary policy might affect
the practice and desirability of rehypothecation. Our theory predicts that
rehypothecation is less valuable in the low-inflation, low-interest rate envi-
ronment prevailing since 2008. Perhaps this is one reason why the practice
has diminished in recent years, though obviously perceptions of risk and
added regulatory controls must also have played a significant role.
The model is also well-suited to exploring the economic impact and
welfare consequences of regulatory interventions designed to restrict rehy-
pothecation. That regulatory restrictions on asset liquidity may in some
cases improve overall liquidity is echoed in a related literature on asset
liquidity in dynamic monetary models, such as Kocherlakota (2003), Shi
(2008), Berentsen, Huber, Marchesiani (2014), Geromichalos and Herren-
21Although we do not model a lack of commitment within the risk-sharing arrangement
here, we have done so in an earlier version of our paper: Andolfatto, Martin and Zhang
(2015, section 6).
22In some interesting related work that abstracts from liquidity issues, Eren (2014) and
Infante (2015) study aspects of the counterparty risk that is commonly associated with
the practice of rehypothecation.
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brueck (2016, 2017). None of these papers, however, specifically deal with
the issue of rehypothecation.
It would be of some interest to extend the model developed here to incor-
porate aggregate uncertainty over returns on securities when commitment
between investors is limited. Consider a version of our model where the cash-
investor wants a U.S. treasury (UST) bond and the credit-investor wants a
mortgage-backed-security (MBS). Imagine further that the conditional fore-
cast over the future MBS dividend is subject to random “news shocks;” e.g.,
see Andolfatto and Martin (2013). Then a “bad news” shock realized in the
evening would unexpectedly lower the price of MBS and raise the price of
USTs through a portfolio rebalance effect, e.g., see Andolfatto (2015). The
cash-investor is at this point is long MBS and short USTs, similar to the
position of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 (Mackintosh, 2008). The
market revaluation of his position makes it more costly for him to reacquire
the promised UST (or its value equivalent). If commitment is weak, then
the UST borrower may strategically default. It would then be possible to
investigate how monetary policy might be designed to accommodate spikes
in “repo failures” in times of financial crisis (see Ho¨rdahl and King, 2008).
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Appendix
A Derivation of (EQM1)–(EQM8)
Here we derive the optimality conditions associated with the investor prob-
lem (12) and (13). Lagrange multipliers are assigned as follows. Let ψ be the
multiplier associated with the budget constraint, (6); λ with the liquidity
constraint, (7); χ1 and χ2 with the regulatory constraints, (R1) and (R2),
respectively; ζ1 and ζ2 with the credit-investor’s non-negativity constraints,
(9) and (10), respectively; and ζ3 with (4). Recall that (5) is implied by
(R2).
The necessary first-order conditions for an optimum are:
u′(y1)− p [ψ + λ− ζ1] = 0 (19)
u′(y2)− pψ = 0 (20)
−λ+ ζ1 + ζ3 − θχ1 = 0 (21)
ζ2 − pφ2χ1 − χ2 = 0 (22)
Vm(m
′, a′)− ψ + ζ1 = 0 (23)
Va(m
′, a′)− pφ2ψ + ζ2 = 0 (24)
By the envelope theorem:
Bm(2m, 2a) = ψ + λ− ζ1 + θχ1/2 (25)
Ba(2m, 2a) = pφ2 [ψ + χ1/2]− ζ2 + (1 + ϑ)χ2/2 (26)
The demands for money and securities in the evening must satisfy:
1/p = βBm(2m
+, 2a+) (27)
φ3 = βBa(2m
+, 2a+) (28)
By the envelope theorem:
Vm(m
′, a′) = 1/p (29)
Va(m
′, a′) = φ3 + ω (30)
We restrict attention to stationary allocations where all real variables
are constant over time and nominal variables grow at rate µ. Combine (19),
(25) and (27) to form,
35
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
µ = β[u′(y1) + θpχ1/2] (31)
When (R1) is slack (χ1 = 0), we get the standard result that µ > β implies
y1 < y
∗.
Now combine (20), (22), (24), (26) and (28) to form:
φ3 = β(φ3 + ω)[(1 + ϑ)u
′(y2) + (1− ϑ)− ϑpχ1]/2 (32)
From conditions (19), (23) and (29), we have
pλ = u′(y1)− 1 (33)
pψ = 1 + pζ1 (34)
which imply λ > 0 iff y1 < y
∗ and ψ > 0 always.
Using (20), (23), (24), (29) and (30) we get
pζ1 = u
′(y2)− 1 (35)
ζ2/φ2 = u
′(y2)− 1 (36)
Note that if y2 = y
∗, then u′(y2) = 1 and so (35)–(36) imply ζ1 = ζ2 = 0.
Finally, using (21), (22), (33)–(36) we get
pζ3 = u
′(y1)− u′(y2) + θpχ1 (37)
pχ1 + χ2/φ2 = u
′(y2)− 1 (38)
Clearly, if χ1 > 0 or χ2 > 0 then y2 < y
∗.
We now invoke the market-clearing conditions m = M and a = 1. Cash-
investors spend all of their cash (when µ = β, they weakly prefer to do so).
Thus, (7) holds with equality. Together with the market-clearing condition,
we have:
2M −m2 = py1 (39)
Finally, the regulatory constraints need to be satisfied in equilibrium. Using
the market clearing conditions and (39) we obtain equilbrium expressions
for the regulatory constraints (R1) and (R2):
a2 − 1 ≤ (θ/φ2)(y1 −M/p) (40)
a2 − 1 ≤ ϑ (41)
Clearly, both constraints cannot bind simultaneously, except in the non-
generic case φ2ϑ = θ(y1 −M/p).
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given that (10) implies a2 ≥ 2a − a′, the flow
budget constraint (6) implies 2m − m′ + pφ2a2 − py1 − py2 ≥ 2m − m′ +
pφ2(2a − a′) − py1 − py2 ≥ 0. Note that (7) and (9) imply m′ ≥ 0. Thus,
2m+ pφ2a2 − py1 − py2 ≥ 0. Given that(7) holds with equality (wlog when
µ = β), 2m− py1 = m2, which yields (8).
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose µ = β. In an unregulated economy,
χ1 = 0. From (31), we get y1 = y
∗. Thus, (37) and (38) imply 1−u′(y2) ≥ 0
and u′(y2) − 1 ≥ 0, respectively. It follows that u′(y2) = 1 and so y2 = y∗.
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows from (31) and χ1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 and 4. See Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. From Proposition 1 we know that y1 = y2 = y
∗
in an unregulated economy. Wlog, set m2 = M (which implies (M/p = y
∗)
and a2 = 1. Then, both (40) and (41) are trivially satisfied and so χ1 =
χ2 = 0. The dividend threshold ω
∗ was defined as one that implements
y2 = y
∗ for ϑ = 0. Hence, wlog set a2 = 1 when ω ≥ ω∗ and so, both (40)
and (41) are satisfied, which implies χ1 = χ2 = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let θ ≥ 1 and assume χ1 > 0. Suppose ζ3 = 0. From
Proposition 5 we know that µ = β implies χ1 = 0, so for this case to be an
equilibrium it must be that µ > β. From (31) we have y1 < y
∗ and from (38)
we have y2 < y
∗. Given y1 < y∗, (33) implies λ > 0 and thus, (7) holds with
equality. Given y2 < y
∗, (35) and (36) imply ζ1 > 0 and ζ2 > 0, respectively.
Thus, m′ = 0 and a′ = a−a2. In addition, since ψ > 0 always, (6) holds with
equality. These results imply that (8) holds with equality as well. Given
ζ3 = 0 and χ1 > 0, (37) implies θpχ1 = u
′(y2)− u′(y1) > 0. Thus, y1 > y2.
Using (7) and (8), both holding with equality, implies 2m−m2 > m2+pφ2a2,
which in equilibrium can be rearranged as 2(M−m2) > pφ2a2. Since χ1 > 0,
the regulatory constraint (40) holds with equality, which using (40) can be
written as: θ(M −m2) = pφ2(a2 − 1). These two expressions put together
imply a2(1 − θ/2) > 1. Given a2 ∈ [0, 2], we need θ < 1 to satisfy this
inequality, a contradiction with θ ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. If ω ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗) and ϑ < Γ(ω), or ω < ωˆ for any
ϑ ∈ [0, 1], then χ2 > 0 and (R2) is satisfied with equality: a2 = 1 + ϑ. By
(38), y2 < y
∗. Thus, (33), (35) and (36) imply λ > 0, ζ1 > 0 and ζ2 > 0,
i.e., (7), (9) and (10) are all satisfied with equality. By Lemma 1, (8) holds
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with equality as well. Given χ1 = 0, (31) implies u
′(y1) = µ/β and thus,
y1 < y
∗ and independent of ϑ.
Suppose ζ3 = 0. Then, m2 ≥ 0 and by (35), y1 = y2. Thus, y2 is also
independent of ϑ. From Proposition 4, we know that ζ3 = 0 for ϑ = 1 only
if ω < ω0(µ) and µ ∈ [β, 1). Thus, ζ3 = 0 for all ϑ ∈ [0, 1] only if ω < ω0(µ)
and µ ∈ [β, 1).
Assume now ω ∈ [ω0(µ), ω∗) and ϑ such that (R2) binds. Then ζ3 > 0,
i.e., m2 = 0 and by (35) y1 < y2. Since m2 = 0 and (8) holds with equality,
y2 = φ2(1 +ϑ). Given that y2/(1 +ϑ) = φ2 = φ3 +ω, we can rewrite (32) as
y2 − (1 + ϑ)ω = (βy2/2)[(1 + ϑ)u′(y2) + (1− ϑ)]
Differentiate both sides by ϑ to obtain (after some rearrangement):
(1 + ϑ)(dy2/dϑ)
[
(2ω/y2)− βy2u′′(y2)
]
= 2ω + βy2[u
′(y2)− 1]
Given u′(y2)− 1 > 0 and u′′(y2) < 0, we obtain dy2/dϑ > 0.
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